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A Study into the Layers of Automated Decision Making:  
Emergent Normative and Legal Aspects of Deep Learning 
The paper dissects the intricacies of Automated Decision Making (ADM) and urges for 
refining the current legal definition of AI when pinpointing the role of algorithms in the 
advent of ubiquitous computing, data analytics and deep learning. ADM relies upon a 
plethora of algorithmic approaches and has already found a wide range of applications in 
marketing automation, social networks, computational neuroscience, robotics, and other 
fields. Whilst coming up with a toolkit to measure algorithmic determination in 
automated/semi-automated tasks might be proven to be a tedious task for the legislator, our 
main aim here is to explain how a thorough understanding of the layers of ADM could be 
a first good step towards this direction: AI operates on a formula based on several degrees 
of automation employed in the interaction between the programmer, the user, and the 
algorithm; this can take various shapes and thus yield different answers to key issues 
regarding agency.  The paper offers a fresh look at the concept of “Machine Intelligence”, 
which exposes certain vulnerabilities in its current legal interpretation. To highlight this 
argument, analysis proceeds in two parts:  Part 1 strives to provide a taxonomy of the 
various levels of automation that reflects distinct degrees of Human – Machine interaction 
and can thus serve as a point of reference for outlining distinct rights and obligations of the 
programmer and the consumer: driverless cars are used as a case study to explore the 
several layers of human and machine interaction. These different degrees of automation 
reflect various levels of complexities in the underlying algorithms, and pose very 
interesting questions in terms of regulating the algorithms that undertake dynamic driving 
tasks. Part 2 further discusses the intricate nature of the underlying algorithms and artificial 
neural networks (ANN) that implement them and considers how one can interpret and 
utilize observed patterns in acquired data. Finally, the paper explores the scope for user 
empowerment and data transparency and discusses attendant legal challenges posed by 
these recent technological developments.  
 
Keywords: machine learning algorithms; ANN; automation; personhood; 
algorithmic accountability. 
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“I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general 
educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to 
speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”  
 
― Alan Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence (1950) 
 
 
1. Going Underwater: On Submarines Swimming in Different Strokes 
 
                   In 1973 the Science Research Council (SRC) commissioned Sir James 
Lighthill, a Professor of Applied Mathematics at Cambridge, to write a report assessing 
the progress of AI research in the UK. The Lighthill report (SRC 1973) outlined three 
separate yet intertwined areas within the broad scope of AI research:  
(i) Advanced Automation (namely, specific automated tasks performed by 
machines such as pattern recognition),  
(ii) Computer Based Research (namely, computational simulations modelling 
neurophysiological theories) and, 
(iii)  Robotics (namely, automatic devices that mimic human functions). 
Lighthill’s findings, painted a somewhat pessimistic picture of the potential that the new 
–at the time- field of robotics might have to operate autonomously. Due to the complexity 
of the tasks such fully automated systems would have to face, human involvement would 
always be required. Simpler programs “written to perform in highly specialised problem 
domains, when the programming takes very full account of the results of human 
experience and human intelligence”  might perform well in specific tasks; building an 
autonomous robot on the other hand, relies on “general-purpose programs seeking to 
mimic the problem-solving aspects of human CNS activity over a rather wide field.”(SRC 
1973). Even so, the human element still cannot be fully taken out of the equation. This, 
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Lighthill posits, is due to the fact that the highly sophisticated datasets used in automated 
systems present the system with a “combinatorial explosion”, namely a wealth of possible 
states of a system. This can only be dealt with resorting to heuristics, “whereby it is the 
programmer’s intelligence that helps the machine deal with the combinatorial explosion”. 
As a result, it would be unrealistic to expect a “highly generalised system that can handle 
a large knowledge base effectively in a learning or self-organising mode” to be developed 
in the near future.  
Lighthill’s ominous predictions have proven to be untrue. Since 1973 great advances have 
occurred in machine learning research, which has led to a wide range of application in 
everyday life: Virtual Personal Assistants like Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana, 
driverless cars and smart thermostats are only a few examples to a rapidly expanding list. 
An important component of these applications is Automated Decision Making (ADM), 
that is, the ability of algorithms to provide solutions in tasks with ambiguous outcomes 
and determine the optimal among a set of possible answers. In light of these 
developments, this paper attempts to provide an overview of the various layers of 
algorithmic determinism in automated and semi-automated tasks. Our hope is that this 
analysis could serve as a useful point of reference for further techno-legal research in 
autonomous systems.  
Fast forward to 2016, Microsoft released an artificial application into the online social 
sphere: a ChatBot called Tay.ai, which was designed to interact with Twitter users and 
learn from these interactions. Within 24 hours, Microsoft had to deactivate Tay’s Twitter 
account, due to a large amount of retweets of racism comments on Tay’s feed, often 
including further offensive commentary by the ChatBot (Perez 2016). Although such 
racial commentary is not unusual online (Williams et al, 2016), the case of Tay is of 
particular interest given that it provides empirical evidence of advanced forms of AI that 
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is able to mimic human behaviour. This interaction between the machine and the human 
is an intricate process that includes various degrees of automation. These result from 
mixing together the user feedback with the algorithm’s behaviour. 
The question of how real and simulated intelligence measure up in AI is hardly a new 
one (for a good overview see Haugeland 1985). Note for example Chomsky’s reading of 
the Alan Turing test (Turing 1950) as an approach that separates the cognitive from the 
biological elements in order to provide an answer as to whether machines can be 
perceived by humans as able to think, not different to fooling someone into believing the 
“submarines can swim” (Chomsky, 1996). This, Chomsky concludes, is a “question of 
decision, not a question of fact”, not different to fooling someone into believing the 
“submarines can swim”.  
This interpretation of “intelligence” lies at the heart of the argument put forth here: to 
legally assess Automated Decision Making, one needs to go beyond the realm of 
biological and cognitive abilities and consider the essence of the concept of 
“personhood”: what defines a person and when is a person autonomous? In other words, 
the level of autonomy displayed by the agent or the machine will also determine the level 
of liability, which is currently a puzzling notion for legal scholars addressing AI. To 
highlight this point, the paper uses driverless cars as a case study and explains how fully 
automated systems bestow upon us the task to develop our theorizing in order to 
accommodate artificial agents within legal doctrines. As it will be shown in the remainder 
of the paper, the matter of “intelligence” in AI is not merely of philosophical nature but 
its definition is much needed to provide solid grounding for emergent legal issues, such 
as tortious liability (Chopra & White, 2011). The latter is of course a legal convention, 
which provides us with a safe tool to address challenging issues in automated systems 
(i.e. liability in driverless cars) but is not on its own enough to account for the 
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reconfiguration of key concepts, such as causation and responsibility. This explains the 
focal point of this paper, which revolves around the personhood of artificial agents.   
Moving away from Chomsky’s narrow interpretation of the Turing test, Russell and 
Norvig (2003) draw an interesting distinction between an artefact’s behaviour and an 
artefacts pedigree: "we can conclude that in some cases, the behaviour of an artefact is 
important, while in others it is the artefact’s pedigree that matters. Which one is important 
in which case seems to be a matter of convention. But for artificial minds, there is no 
convention." 
To elucidate such intricacies, the following section provides an overview of ADM and its 
mechanics, namely some related machine learning algorithms and the current trend 
towards deep learning.  
 
2. A Contextual Analysis of Emergent Normative and Legal aspects in 
Automated Systems: The Intricacies of Machine Learning Algorithms 
 
The aim of this section is to first establish an understanding of the technical context, 
within which ADM occurs. This will not only allow us to explain better how a definition 
of “intelligence” in AI is somewhat elusive but it will also provide a solid methodological 
grounding, given that the approach taken here is a techno-legal overview of automated 
systems. Recent advances in machine learning and computational complexity theory have 
been further boosted by the ability to collect, manipulate and store vast amounts of data. 
ADM is a natural product of these exciting developments and has found a wide range of 
applications in seemingly unrelated fields like marketing automation, social networks, 
computational neuroscience, robotics, banking, transportation and others. 
Machine learning algorithms often employ artificial neural networks (ANNs). This means 
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that the computational units these algorithms use to perform intelligent functions 
resemble biological networks and neurons. ANNs take advantage of powerful algorithms 
that are trained using large datasets available in many industries (image databases, 
security or healthcare records, traffic or consumer behaviour data, online platform 
analytics, etc.) so that they can correctly decide upon suitable actions when new data are 
presented to them in a similar way to what a human agent would do; for example to 
recognise faces or operate driverless cars. The purpose of ADM is to be able to act without 
the need of human intervention. They are be able to deal with novel conditions, that is 
take the right decision even when the dataset presented to them is different from the one 
they have been trained on, e.g. a driverless car should be able to navigate in a road it has 
not had access before.  
How do ANN algorithms learn to perform complicated tasks efficiently? Put simply, the 
answer lies in exploiting both increased computational power and vast amounts of data 
already collected. This data is used by the programmer to train the algorithm. Technically, 
training is often done in one of the following three ways: supervised, unsupervised or 
reinforcement learning, see e.g. (Mohri et al., 2012). These are technical terms that relate 
to  the details of the training process and  are distinct from potential interactions with the 
user after the algorithm is passed on to her in e.g. human-in-the-loop and similar 
applications. 
Supervised learning (SL) occurs when during training the algorithm is fed with both an 
input and the correct decision (output). For example, when the algorithm has to 
distinguish between faces and objects in a scene, the input would be an image and the 
output a class index, e.g. 1 for faces and 2 for objects. The algorithm is then given pairs 
of images and class indices that are used to fine tune its parameters. The algorithm has to 
find the correct class index when – after learning- it is presented with a new image that 
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may or may not contain a face (Nakajima et al, 2000). 
Unsupervised learning (UL) is quite similar conceptually. Using the above simple 
example, the difference is that the algorithm would have to guess whether the image 
contains a face or not without being explicitly given the corresponding indices during the 
training process (Kumar et al., 2010). Of course, when designed, the algorithm is fed with 
some information about the task, e.g. it would know it should decide between two 
possible alternatives, however it is not given which images contain faces and which do 
not, it has to discover these differences based on certain features that the images might 
contain, e.g. eyes, nose and mouth at close proximity in all images that contain faces. In 
a more difficult scenario, the algorithm might even have to decide how many classes or 
categories there might be in the data, something that might lead to it over- or under-
estimating this number. In such clustering or classification tasks the algorithm puts 
together points that are related in some conceptual space. Of course, the dimensions of 
this space (which features should be selected) are crucial for making the algorithm 
efficient and are chosen by the programmer in the design stage. This is important as it 
might introduce a bias in the output of the decision process: depending on what features 
the programmer chooses to be important, the algorithm might take different decisions. 
We call this the “bias” introduced by the programmer to the ADM algorithm. The reader 
should keep this term in mind as we will come back to it in section 4.2 below. Bias is not 
only an issue in unsupervised learning but also in other machine learning approaches like 
Reinforcement Learning to which we now turn: 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is slightly more complicated: it decouples actions from 
rewards and the algorithm aims not at taking the “right” action (decision), but maximizing 
the reward it receives (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is merely a technical distinction that 
renders the description of the relevant algorithms slightly more complicated – for 
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example, the algorithm might have to take several actions one after the other to maximize 
an end goal (reward). Interestingly, this decoupling speaks to the ability of the algorithm 
to take sequential decisions that are related to each other and think ahead in time; for 
example, the DeepMind algorithm that plays the Atari game Breakout should find a 
balance between the time it spends at each location firing and the speed it moves if it 
wants to accumulate sufficient reward (high score) and successfully proceed to the next 
level (Mnih et al., 2015). Furthermore, this balance might change in time or as the level 
of the game advances. Contrary to the other two approaches, the emphasis in RL is in 
combining several decisions (or actions) to get the most benefit out of them. In other 
words, reward is a complicated function of two or more decisions that might be unknown 
even to the programmer, let alone the user herself. 
RL is today considered to be a promising avenue for building intelligent algorithms that 
can adapt to different environments and even tasks; an important limitation in older 
machine learning approaches was the lack of flexibility: e.g. an algorithm might learn to 
play chess at master level but would be unable to play checkers, which for most human 
players that know the rules chess would be easy to pick up. This is why algorithms are 
often trained to perform within a limited set of conditions and cannot succeed when rules 
changes, even slightly. In a paper published last year, DeepMind researchers showed that 
the same algorithm could perform well in several Atari games without being trained in 
each one individually (Minh et al., 2015) Essentially, the algorithm learns different 
mappings between actions and rewards online and is able to flexibly maximize the benefit 
it receives when the environment (game) changes. 
All three learning approaches have a long history in machine learning, however recent 
successes like the DeepMind algorithm for playing Atari games discussed above followed 
technical advances sometimes referred to collectively as Deep Learning (DL). For 
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example, the DeepMind work uses Deep-Q Learning which is a combination of RL and 
DL (Van Hasselt et al., 2015). Roughly speaking, the term “Deep” here refers to 
increasing the power (and complexity) of an algorithm by taking its basic constituent 
parts and using them recursively, that is feeding the output of one part to the other. 
Crucially, each part uses a similar learning process, however only after combining all 
parts together is the system (building a deep architecture) able to perform well. If the 
architecture of the algorithm is changed, e.g. a smaller number of constituent parts are 
used, then the algorithm might not be able to take the right decision of find the action that 
maximise its reward. 
Architectural details like e.g. the exact number of parts (layers) in the system or how 
“big” each part should be in terms of how many computational units should be used are 
often found by experience. This is in contrast with older approaches and rule-based 
simulations where the algorithms were implemented in much smaller computer 
infrastructures and the role of different computational elements involved was more 
transparent. Interestingly, it might not be a principled explanation as to why certain deep 
(extended) architectures work and others don’t something often referred to as the deep 
algorithms being somehow “opaque”. This idea has its roots in neuroscience where a 
succession of brain areas – e.g. the ventral system- plays a similar role to a deep network 
architecture. In this setting, certain brain areas situated away from sensory regions light 
up and respond to different stimuli e.g. some areas respond to faces and others to objects. 
This means that these areas are sensitive to the category of the visual stimuli and can 
distinguish between categories. Crucially, earlier (visual) areas would respond to 
anything placed in the visual field regardless of its category. However, only higher areas 
that receive input from several upstream regions are able to distinguish between different 
categories of visual stimuli. In brief, the brain decides about the category of the stimulus 
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by combining signals from several areas that interact in a large network. Similarly, it is 
only after the programmer endows its algorithm with several parts and builds a “deep” 
hierarchical architecture that the algorithm can distinguish between classes of visual 
stimuli. 
So what have we lost by making the algorithm deep? Maybe we have found a way to 
replace humans with intelligent agents that can perform well and take the right decisions; 
however, we cannot claim that the algorithm really understands or interprets its input the 
way a human would do. This poses an interesting challenge for law, and in particular 
regarding the concept of “agency”, as deep algorithms have the ability to act upon their 
input, e. g. take a decision. In this case, the definition of “act” is stretched beyond the 
narrow confinements of conventional legal formalism; algorithms do not serve as mere 
tools but are able to take well informed decisions under little or no supervision at all.  
Most importantly, there exists an additional dimension that further muddles the waters 
for legally assessing ADM: what is the scope for the user’s involvement in the decision 
process? Given the complexity in the process of decision making, a clear understanding 
of the interactions between the machine and the human agent is necessary not only for 
attributing responsibility for the outcome of the decision met but further to explore the 
causality, intent and risk assessment. Take for example the law of negligence, a tort 
introduced partly in response to the problems of agency: direct liability would only apply 
in supervised systems, whereas indirect liability under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior would require a certain level of foreseeability, namely “normalised expectations 
for the technical capacities of computer action” (Teubner, 2007).  
In applications that require a human-in-the-loop like Brain Computer Interface (BCI), 
assisted Decision Making and Health Informatics the user already plays an active role in 
this process. In such cases, the user acts supplementary to the algorithm and interacts with 
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it. This leads to increased performance and efficiency of the algorithm and good 
performance even in situations of high uncertainty or increased risk. What makes human-
in-the-loop algorithms different to autonomous systems is not the way training is carried 
out but the possibility of human intervention at intermediate stages of the training process. 
The human intervenes to enhance the algorithm’s performance by bringing in knowledge 
the algorithm has no access to. Intermediate training follows the general procedures we 
have described above  but the user has a decisive role in selecting new training datasets 
that have been pre-processed by her, e.g. throw irrelevant parts  away or intervene at 
intermediate stages to  assess the quality of results produced  and guide  the algorithm 
accordingly. For example, in (Awasthi et al.,2015) an algorithm used limited supervision 
to cluster data in a certain number of groups with the help of the user who  at each stage 
told the algorithm whether it should split or merge some of it .   
Thus far we have discussed the technical details underlying machine learning algorithms 
used in ADM. These summarise what we earlier called the artefact’s pedigree.  In the 
following section, we focus on the artefact’s behaviour and use driverless cars as a case 
study to explore the various levels of automation: this allows us to gain a better 
understanding of various degrees of human-machine interaction, which will serve as a 
reference point for the remainder of the paper and shall aid us in our quest to understand 
the balance between the algorithm’s inner workings – that are often opaque – and human 
intervention.  
 
3. A Taxonomy of Automation Layers: Driverless Cars as a Case Study 
 
The prospect of fully autonomous vehicles “designed to be capable of safely competing 
journeys without the need for a driver” (Department for Transport Code of Practise) has 
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certainly gained momentum in the past few years: Google Chauffeur software currently 
tested in autonomous vehicles in California, Rio Tinto’s autonomous haulage systems 
operating since 2008 in Australia or Volvo’s pioneering programme “Drive me” expected 
to release autonomous vehicles to customers in Gothenburg by 2017 are a few indicative 
cases of the great potential automated systems have shown in the transport industry 
(Atkins 2015). This however is far from removing drivers completely “off the loop”, 
although many manufacturers have already introduced semi-automated vehicles with 
driving assistance features, such as controlling the brake, throttle and steering, supporting 
active lane-keeping or using sensors to deliver full speed adaptive cruise control (KPMG 
2013).  
It is thus apparent that automated systems, such as autonomous vehicles, operate on 
several different degrees of automation, according to how much control is yielded to the 
driver. In other words, the novel element here is not automation per se but the variety of 
degrees of interaction between the man and the machine. Take for example the case study 
of driverless cars explored here:  automated driving is not really a striking fact nowadays; 
the auto-mobile started replacing the horse-drawn carriages in the turn of the 20th century. 
The initial scepticism towards the new risks posed by the technological advances was 
followed by gradual adoption of the new means of transport, mainly due to the 
codification of automated driving in law. As Moris (2007) notes “In the 1890s 
improvements in the internal combustion engine, legal and political developments which 
severely restricted the power of cities to regulate the types of traffic on their streets (won 
by bicycle advocates), the [aforementioned] invention of traffic rules, and smooth new 
asphalt street surfaces paved the way for the private automobile. Enticed by high speeds, 
point-to-point travel and the flexibility to roam across the urban landscape, the public 
adopted the new innovation in droves”. Transport related legal issues, mainly liability, 
International Review of Law Computers & Technology, Vol 2 – 2017  
(Special issue: Justice in Algorithmic Robes) 
14 
 
have been dealt with a dynamic body of regulations at a national and international level, 
which have taken an anthropocentric view: assumption of risk, bad judgement, and 
reasonable foreseeability, are a few grounds upon which causality can be established. At 
the same time, they all have one common point of departure: human error as a sine qua 
non of the decision making process.   
The elimination of human error is however also one of the key elements behind self-
driving cars. A 2008 NHTSA report attributes 40% of collisions to “recognition errors”, 
caused by distractions, and 35% to “decision errors”, such as speeding. It is thus expected 
that removing the human element from driving will enhance road safety (NHTSA, 2008). 
Recent progress in computer vision like the use of massively parallel graphic processing 
units and deep learning algorithms have led to a revolution in the field of driverless cars. 
The quest for self-driving vehicles was initiated with DARPA’s Grand Challenges: this 
was a competition among such vehicles where external operators were allowed to 
intervene in the vehicles’ route to minimize risk and ensure safety (e.g. by stopping and 
restarting the vehicles). Since then, several milestones have been reached and fully 
autonomous driving has become a reality (Urmson et al., 2008; Levinson et al., 2011; 
2014; Wei et al., 2013). Of course, due to the complexity and breadth of possible driving 
conditions, achieving fully autonomous cars that  have sufficient training so that they are 
able to perform well in any situation is far from solved (despite using huge training 
datasets, that include millions of highway and road images etc.). However, extending 
basic computer vision algorithms to the level of replacing human agents is now 
considered viable and several reports of self-driving cars have appeared in the media, e.g. 
(Rosen, R.,2012; Hull,L., 2013). 
Thus, it is not the technology or the externalities it unavoidably creates that hinder our 
legal understanding of automated decision making. What is challenging for legal minds, 
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is an unprecedented variety of interfaces and levels of interaction between the human and 
a machine learning algorithm. To put it differently, to fully assess  these algorithms one 
will have to perceive to what extent the human element (directly by human-in-the-loop 
interventions or indirectly at the design stage) is present in the “intelligence” 
demonstrated by the algorithm. As noted in section 2 above, it is imperative that a basic 
taxonomy for ADM is adopted prior to any legal evaluation to enhance our understanding 
of how each “automated” task involves constant shifts of roles from executing to merely 
supervising (Sheridan 1970). 
 The study of these interactions has given rise to many theories discussing ontological 
and deontological approaches regarding automated functions and the degree of human 
involvement (Fitts 1951). As a result, many taxonomies of various degrees of automation 
have been suggested in a quest to localise informational control in the human or 
automaton domain: Sheridan and Verplank’s ten degrees of automation (1978) are 
probably the most widely adopted theory that describes variations of control from human 
to collaborative and to fully automated, Endsley and Kaber’s theory (1999) emphasizes 
on supported, blended or automated decision making, whereas Riley’s taxonomy (1989) 
uses a mixed assessment based on various levels of autonomy that intersect with different 
degrees of intelligence. These theories have provided the ground for authorities such as 
the NHTSA or the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE, see figure 1) to identify 5 
levels of automation in computer assisted driving:   
(i) No-Automation (Level 0), i.e. the system automatically assists the driver to regain lost 
control of the vehicle. 
(ii) Function-specific Automation (Level 1), i.e. the system controls one function.  
(iii) Combined Function Automation (Level 2), i.e. the system controls at least two 
functions. 
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(iv) Limited Self-Driving Automation (Level 3), i.e. the driver cedes full control under 
specific conditions,  
(v) Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4), i.e. the driver is not expected to become 
involved throughout the duration of the trip. 
 
 
                                                           Source: cyberlaw.stanford.edu/loda – SAE Information Report J3016 
Further to this, the NHTSA Federal Automated Vehicles Policy published in 
September 2016 by the US Department of Transportation, outlines in more detail the term 
“highly automated vehicle” (HAV), which represents SAE Levels 3-5 vehicles with 
automated systems that are responsible for monitoring the driving environment. This 
variety of human – machine interaction introduces a new complexity: “the vehicle must 
be capable of accurately conveying information to the human driver regarding intentions 
and vehicle performance”, as well as to its environment, namely “other external actors 
with whom the HAV may have interactions (other vehicles, pedestrians, etc.)”. To put 
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this differently, it does matter whether the average observer can tell whether a vehicle is 
autonomous or not, as this changes the degree of reliance towards the ability of a driver 
to manoeuvre and shapes reasonable expectations accordingly. This is particularly 
interesting when one considers Level 3 SAE systems, which are expected to be monitored 
by the driver, although human capacity to stay alert when disengaged from the driving 
task may be limited.  
Driverless cars are a recent example where automated systems have made great 
progress and reached a level, where the operator can be completely ignored. Earlier 
examples include aviation (Spizer, 1987) and medicine (Thompson, 1994), leading up to 
the emergence of the DoNotPay Bot in 2016, the world’s first “robot lawyer”, offering 
free legal advice to the homeless. We have chosen to discuss driverless cars in the paper, 
as the various degrees of automation discussed above, capture perfectly this interplay 
between the operator and the agent. As Sheridan notes “Automation has moved from 
open-loop mechanization of industrial revolution, then to simple closed loop linear 
control, then to non-linear and adaptive control and recently to a mic of crisp and fuzzy 
rule-based decision, neural nets and generic algorithms that truly recognize patterns and 
learn” (Sheridan 2000). This in turn has also marked a shift from automated ML (aML) 
to interactive ML (iML) (Holzinger, 2016), namely an almost seamless interaction 
between the machine and the operator. The more sophisticated the system is, the more it 
changes the nature of human performance, challenging thereby our understanding of who 
the operator of a given task is, and to what extent she needs to apply own cognitive 
capacities (Parasuraman, 1997). From a legal standpoint, this is highly problematic as 
such interactions lend anthropomorphic traits to otherwise automatically executed tasks. 
In a similar vein, Calo (2015) outlines three distinctive features in robotics that blend the 
boundaries between the human and the machine: embodiment of the algorithm (e.g. the 
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car in our case study), emergence (the “coupling of complexity and usefulness”) and 
social valence, namely the public reliance on automated systems. Ultimately, he 
concludes that new juridical insights will be required to fully perceive this emerging field 
from a legal viewpoint and accurately evaluate to what extend automated systems can be 
treated as social actors, able to “think” for us  after having benefited from our social 
experiences. This echoes Teubner (2007), who having reviewed Luhmann and Latour, 
explains how most legal actors are created by social attribution, without the need to 
possess any ontological human properties, such as reflexive capacities or empathy. That 
said, artificial agents are still beyond the narrow confinements of our current 
anthropocentric view of legal actors.   
Can autonomous cars drive us, in the same sense that submarines can swim? So far we 
have focused on how advances in machine learning have led to highly sophisticated 
automated systems that can potentially throw the operator out-of-the-loop. To understand 
this better, let us take the Google driverless car as an example and focus on how it can 
operate with minimal supervision. The Google algorithm for driverless cars performs the 
following   operations: (i) self-localization using 3D map technologies (ii) determination 
of static and moving obstacles (iii) classification of information/objects by using machine 
vision (iv) generation of road condition predictions (v) evaluation of these predictions 
against real circumstances (vi) automated actions like steering, braking or accelerating, if 
required (Titiriga, 2016). These are the same operations a human driver would have to 
undertake; however the sense of agency is in this case different: what do notions like 
“average reasonable person”, “free will”, “mens rea” and degrees of culpability mean in 
the case of driverless cars? Such questions present us with an “indirect agency”, a status 
which is not easy to assess legally using frequently evoked criteria. 
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Let us then consider each of the above steps independently: in operations (ii) and 
(iii) the algorithm has to perform image and object recognition, segmentation and 
classification. Given the limited degree of automation in the decision making process, it 
can be argued that these steps correspond to levels 0-2, in the SAE taxonomy mentioned 
above. In other words, the algorithm has to first understand how many objects exist in its 
view and then classify them into pedestrians, cars, traffic lights etc. This means that the 
algorithm has to boost interesting parts of the image over not so interesting ones; for 
example, be able to distinguish between a pedestrian standing next to a still or obscure 
background, e.g. a traffic light at a crossing or in a pavement with low lighting. 
Segmentation is then carried out using some sensors (cameras, lasers etc.) that should be 
able to learn new environments in an unsupervised way (Levinson, J., & Thrun, S., 2014).  
In this context, recognition and classification of human and objects in the car’s proximity 
might go beyond simple processing of visual input through the car’s camera and applying 
labels to objects using a database stored in the car: they might require autonomous 
interactions with electronic systems and databases outside the vehicle like GPS-based 
guidance systems and information from the Department of Transportation (DOT) that 
would allow the algorithm to localize the vehicle and its neighbouring objects and 
surroundings (Zhu,J., et al., 2014). Furthermore, information about the car’s location and 
other parameters (speed, direction etc.) should be passed on to a central (global) guidance 
system and database at a remote location, e.g. DOT so that other (neighbouring) vehicles 
might be informed about the car’s trajectory and parameters. 
Operations (iv)-(vi) above are more complicated and as such, correspond to SAE levels 
3 – 5 (see Figure 1 above): on top of image processing and computer vision tasks, the 
algorithm of the driverless car has to solve an inherently dynamic problem where on top 
of image processing the algorithm has also to predict trajectories in time, both its own 
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and neighbouring cars e.g. predict the future location of the car in the front given its speed 
to avoid collision in case it breaks unexpectedly. It also has to generate appropriate 
steering commands, breaking, acceleration and  be able to associate past and future 
driving conditions, e.g. if the ground map includes information about a congested road 
coming up the algorithm could look for alternative routes or try to slow down even though 
obstacles might not be directly visible. All these operations endow the algorithm with a 
novel sense of agency as it effectively acts in lieu of a driver and behaves like one. What 
are the criteria for legally assessing this new sort of agency?  
This question does not suggest that automated vehicles operate on a legal vacuum. 
On the contrary, the issue of liability has been debated many times at a national, federal 
and international level and although incoherent, most solutions suggested in the 
regulatory domain move towards strict liability. Given however the different types of 
driverless cars (reflecting various shades of automation), there is no size that fits all:  
Volvo, for instance has declared that the company will pay for any damages caused by its 
fully autonomous IntelliSafe Autopilot system. With regards to Google’s car, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has recognized that the software, not 
the human, is the driver. At the same time though, the international Vienna Convention 
on Road Traffic gives responsibility for the car to the driver, requiring that “[e]very driver 
shall at all times be able to control his vehicle”. The amendment to Vienna Convention, 
which came into effect in 2016, to include article 8 paragraph 5bis VC, does little in 
clarifying matters regarding autonomous vehicles: as it is premise on the assumption that 
such automated systems can be overridden by the driver, it does not take into account 
fully automated systems. Far from establishing legal certainty, the current regulative 
framework regarding automated vehicles is still dispersed and in working progress. At 
the same time, the issue of agency is barely addressed, mainly due to the challenging issue 
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of proving actual causation in automated technology (Wittenberg, 2016). Next, follows 
an attempt to understand the agent’s artificial “intelligence” through the lens of 
personhood – a doctrinal approach beyond the strict confines of liability. 
 
4. Deep Learning Conundrums: The Importance of Assumptions in 
Automated Decision Making Algorithms.  
 
To address this question we will examine below the concept of personhood together with 
algorithmic transparency. But before, let us pause for an intermediate summary: so far, 
we have attempted to provide a descriptive (section 2) and normative analysis (section 3) 
of machine learning algorithms. These analyses have validated the hypothesis set out in 
the introduction, that ADM  is a challenging concept for law because it rests on  both the 
artefact’s pedigree (see section 2) and the artefact’s behaviour (see section 3). These are 
two separate yet intertwined elements in the process of mimicking human behaviour. In 
the case of driverless cars considered above, it was shown how human behaviour 
reinforces the artefact’s pedigree, while at the same time the artefact’s behaviour can 
occur without any human involvement. Therein lies the heart of the argument put forth 
here: the understanding of what robotic “intelligence” is by legal scholars is often limited; 
to this shortcoming one should add the increased complexity of modern techniques like 
RL and deep algorithms in AI that lead to a difficult conundrum; importantly, this 
conundrum cannot be addressed purely with metaphors as it is often the case for other 
questions that are new to legal research (Calo 2016). Earlier, we considered different 
levels of automation in machine learning algorithms and different shades of human 
agency inbuilt in systems using deep learning. This led us to conclude that tools for legal 
assessment that are currently available (e.g. Vienna Convention) are expected to be 
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unable to capture the different levels of automation and human-machine interaction. For 
example, RL is often characterised by an opaque mechanism of decision making: 
although RL robots bear anthropomorphic features, it is still not clear to the lawmaker 
how to deal with this emergent concept of “assimilated personhood”1. In this final part, 
the paper explores the necessity for a new concept of personhood together with 
algorithmic transparency in ADM and attempts to show how modern machine learning 
algorithms like RL present us with new challenges that require novel sets of standards. 
 
4.1.Artificial Personhood v. Simulated Personhood: Focusing on “the loop” 
 
 (Gray 1921) defined personhood as the quality of as any entity possessing “intelligence 
and will”.  The idea that AI systems should be given entitlements to personhood is hardly 
a new one: there is already rich literature (Allan and Widdison, 1996; Kerr and Millar, 
2001; Chopra and White, 2011) that suggests that autonomous artificial agents could 
potentially be considered as entities meriting “legal” personhood.  
This is not the first time that entities other than a person are entitled to the 
responsibilities and rights associated with the notion of personhood. In the early 19th 
century, the US Supreme Court in Dartmouth described corporations as “an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law”, which 
displays in fact certain personhood virtues, not as a person but as a “mere creature of 
law.” (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). Since then, modern 
corporate law has developed a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that these entities 
                                                 
1 The term is used here to highlight how this is different not only to the traditional “personhood” 
but also to the notion of “artificial personhood” (doctrine of corporate personhood). 
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- being the creation of private initiative and market forces- incorporate competing 
interests that need to be accounted for (Kaeb 2015). In a similar vein, robots and artificial 
agents are highly automated systems that are equally premised on “private initiative and 
market forces” and would therefore fit the criteria of “legal personhood” as such. In the 
era of algorithms being the driving force behind unmanned systems that could inflict 
harm, like military drones,  it is imperative not to afford them “the blessings of perpetual 
life and limited liability” (Rehnquist dissenting in Pellotti with regard to banking 
corporations).  
This proposition has of course not gone without criticism: automated systems 
cannot experience life as a good to itself given their lack of consciousness (Aleksander 
1994; Franklin 1995) and would fall beyond the strict confinements of liability as a 
punishment aiming at deterrence (Bentham, 2009). Such arguments however 
oversimplify the way in which automated systems operate and do not carefully consider 
the various levels of automation, as described above. Solum (1992) has therefore 
disregarded these claims as purely “behaviouristic approaches” and has urged for a 
distinction between simulated and artificial intelligence. This would be a good first step 
towards addressing some of the most complicated regulatory problems posed by AI: 
limited foreseeability of actions, operations based on a highly compartmentalised and 
opaque design, and a narrow scope of controlled tasks, are only a few examples that 
demonstrate the need to fully grasp the contours of “intelligence” in AI (Scherer, 2016). 
 
4.2. The “Intelligence and Will” in Deep Learning: An interpretation of opacity  
 
We saw earlier, that deep learning algorithms for ADM have an intricate architecture, are 
often opaque and allow for various levels of human-machine interaction and autonomy. 
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In other words, they are much more complex and less transparent than earlier rule- based 
algorithms, however, this additional complexity has not adequately been taken into 
account in their legal assessment to date. We also suggested that such intricacies render 
the understanding the concept of “personhood” associated with ADM algorithms 
problematic.   
Earlier, we associated personhood with any entity possessing “intelligence and will”. A 
highly sophisticated and automated system can be considered to possess “personhood” 
but in what ways is the system “intelligent” and has “will”? Furthermore, the system was 
designed by a programmer and might sometimes be influenced by the user. Both the 
programmer and the user have their one distinct “personhoods”, so how do they interfere 
with the “system’s personhood”? 
We here propose that to address the above difficult questions one needs to  adopt a legal 
approach that will focus on both what the infrastructure and behaviour of the automated 
system is and what the role of  the human element (programmer, user) might be, see also 
(Jones, 2015). This means that one needs to go beyond older approaches that put too much 
emphasis on how (i) efficient   (cf Citron, 2007) and  (ii) objective the algorithm is 
(Zarsky, 2015) without at the same time considering what the potential role of the human 
influence might be. As we saw earlier, this influence can be important for the algorithms 
output; for example, it might introduce biases in the outputs of the automated decision 
process.  
Dissecting the role of the human element is not an easy task, because, as we saw earlier, 
human influence might be hidden behind opaque architectures of the sort used in deep 
learning or might be indirect in the case of human-in-the-loop applications.  This might 
be important for the correct legal assessment of liability and similar issues in modern 
ADM: if one neglects the influence of the programmer or operator, she runs the chance 
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of not correctly attributing to humans flaws in the ADM algorithms for which the humans 
should be held responsible. Of course, the opacity of the algorithms does not render this 
an easy task especially for legal scholars; however only by taking a deeper look into the 
ADM mechanics could we have any hope of properly understanding   concepts like 
personhood and liability associated with highly automated systems.  
A good number of scholars (Pasquale, 2015; Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Crawford and 
Schultz, 2014; Zarsky, 2016) are currently focusing their critique towards the high levels 
of opacity and urge the law to “open the black box of algorithms” or even set up a body 
of independent auditors to carefully examine ADM (Sandvig et al., 2014). In section 2 
above, we saw that one important aspect of this opacity that can perhaps be easily 
quantified is the “bias” introduced by the programmer to the ADM algorithm: this 
referred to some feature selection or similar process that crucially affects the output 
(decision) of the algorithm and which results from the programmer’s direct input at the 
stage of designing the algorithm. We agree with the aforementioned scholars about the 
need to restore transparency as a much needed ex post measure to eliminate bias and 
evaluate human involvement and liability. Yet, we will argue, opening the black box of 
algorithms only sees part of the picture when it comes to modern ADM algorithms as it 
merely focus on the algorithms’ design. On the other hand, the “intelligence and the will” 
of the algorithm cannot be disconnected from its performance after the design process 
(and training) has been finalised: for example, when the driverless car has to navigate in 
real world conditions and interact with human agents (imagine such a car navigating 
through a street filled with other cars driven by humans). At that moment, the algorithm 
has its own personhood,  mimics human behaviour and perhaps continuously interacts 
with humans like a normal person would do. All these are emergent normative features 
that should be taken into careful consideration during proper legal assessment of deep 
International Review of Law Computers & Technology, Vol 2 – 2017  
(Special issue: Justice in Algorithmic Robes) 
26 
 
learning algorithms: we argue that understanding the mechanics of these algorithms at 
the stage (level) of their design is insufficient and should be supplemented by the study 
of what the overall scope of human involvement at all stages might be including training 
and unsupervised or semi –supervised performance. For example, consider a driverless 
car that is first trained in a racing track, then performs successfully in the highway and 
then is assisted by a human when navigating in narrower streets. Is it enough to merely 
study the technical details of the algorithms that are used and also try to embed morality 
in their design? We argue it is not, and suggest that the law should also attempt to define 
the “intelligence” or “smartness” (Hildenbrandt, 2015) of the algorithm as well as how 
this is affected by the subsequent human influence (after the algorithm is designed and 
training has been completed). 
 
 
5. Conclusion: From the Imitation Game to the Voigt-Kampff Test -
Towards an Updated Legal Understanding of Machine Intelligence  
 
This paper has attempted to provide a normative and legal grounding of the “intelligence” 
demonstrated in automated systems that rely on deep learning. This is highly relevant 
nowadays, as the technological advances in robotics and cognitive sciences have paved 
the way to more sophisticated systems that can act and in a completely autonomous 
manner. These systems demonstrate remarkable abilities to mimic human behaviour: this 
can be happen in such unprecedented ways that interactions between algorithms and 
humans can be quite difficult to predict, e.g. consider Microsoft 2016’s apology on their 
official blog regarding their Chabot Tay, and its racist comments on Twitter. The law has 
therefore to inevitably adopt a new concept of personhood that will deal with behaviours 
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of modern human-like agents. This concept should go beyond the scope of traditional 
(weak) AI and reconsider what  “personhood” might be; also, how personhood can be 
described when  human-like autonomous agents that act in an “intelligent” manner, learn 
and evolve on their own interact with humans in real world environments.  
This unavoidably takes us down the treacherous road of providing definitions of concepts 
like “intelligence”; a tedious task in itself due to the relativity the concept bears. A simple 
question that comes to mind when one first tries to define this concept is the following: 
is it a concept that can be understood in terms of a mechanism (or an algorithm) that 
generates certain (human-like) behaviours or is it a matter of a human perceiving an agent 
(a human or a machine) as intelligent? Although Turing’s original intention in 
‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ was to explore whether a computer can “imitate 
a brain” (Copeland, 2004), he  then admitted to be sceptical as to how  the intelligence of 
a machine was to be perceived: “The extent to which we regard something as behaving 
in an intelligent manner” he noted (Turing, 1950) “is determined as much by our own 
state of mind and training as by the properties of the object under consideration” (see also 
Minsky, 1988 for a similar view). In other words, Turing suggests that “intelligence” 
relates to how we perceive it in a manner remarkably similar to how the legal system 
operates: Turing’s “perception” of intelligence is akin to the principle of “interpretation”. 
The legal system tries to interpret human behaviours not to understand the mechanisms 
(algorithms) that might have generated them; this might be one reason why automated 
systems are not easily perceived in law and humanities in general. To address these 
shortcomings, theorists have sought to elucidate additional dimensions of machine 
intelligence, like consciousness (Floridi, 2005), along the same lines of the empathy test 
employed in Philip Dick’s fictitious Voigt-Kampff test (Dick, 1968). Whereas intelligent 
processing shall always be opaque, it is desirable to go past the prima facie 
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anthropomorphism of automated systems and actually enhance our understanding of what 
their “intelligence” might be. Deep Learning for instance, might yield results that even 
the programmers cannot anticipate. We therefore suggest that our perception of machine 
intelligence should be enhanced; this could either happen ex ante (“at the input stage”) or 
ex post (“at the output stage”): 
(i) ex ante efforts could include monitoring or prescribing the algorithm’s design features 
and principles e.g. carefully selecting training data or initial weights so that they are 
consistent with legal or ethical constraints.  
(ii) ex post efforts on the other hand, refer mostly to the user’s interpretation and feedback 
after the algorithm has performed an intelligent function (taken a decision).  This is also 
important as it places ADM within the socio-legal context it belongs to.   
 
Machine learning has reached such a sophisticated level that it could not only result in 
misrepresenting an automated system that passed  the Turing test as a human but 
importantly  escape liability due to the judiciary’s inability to attribute a concept of 
“personhood” to  the system (algorithm). In his response to the Lighthill report we 
mentioned at the beginning, Prof Longuet Higgins made a remarkably timely remark, 
relevant to our discussion thirty years later.  Interestingly, Prof Higgins foresaw the 
danger of an algorithmic system wrongfully escaping liability: “The mathematician's 
ability to discover a theorem, the formulation of a strategy in master chess, the 
interpretation of a visual field as a landscape with three cows and a cottage, the feat of 
hearing what someone says at a cocktail party and the triumph of reading one's aunt's 
handwriting, all seem to involve the same general skill, namely the ability to integrate in 
a flash a wide range of knowledge and experience. Perhaps Advanced Automation will 
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indeed go its own sweet way, regardless of Cognitive Science; but if it does so, I fear that 
the resulting spin-off is more than likely to inflict multiple injuries on human society”. 
Since the Lighthill report, the concept of machine “intelligence” has no doubt gained new 
dimensions. The law however seems to be lagging behind. This paper has sought to 
explore the challenges put forth by the application of modern machine learning algorithms 
like deep networks and reinforcement learning in the area of Automated Decision Making 
(ADM), which merits further research and consideration. We hope that our findings shall 
mobilise legal scholars and ethicists to undertake the difficult task of further dissecting 
the emergent normative features associated with ADM in the not so distant future. 
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